

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0452

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: UK PROPOSAL ON APPROPRIATE DEFINITION
OF THE COMMON CEILING

REF: (A) USNATO 5387 DRG 031300Z OCT 75

(B) STATE 135536 DTG 102330Z JUN 75

(C) MBFR VIENNA 0138 251746Z MAR 75

(D) MBFR VIENNA 0158 DTG 070900Z APR 75

(E) USNATO 5440 DTG 070950Z OCT 75

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT THE US
SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRONGLY OPPOSE THE UK PROPOSAL TO
INCLUDE IN THE DRAFT POSITION PAPER LANGUAGE REQUIRING
PHASE I UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE EAST ON BOTH THE LEVEL OF
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THE COMMON CEILING AND THE LEVELS OF GROUND (AND AIR)

FORCE PERSONNEL OF BOTH SIDES BEFORE PHASE I REDUCTIONS. THESE PROPOSALS REPRESENT OUTRIGHT CONFLATION, ADDING GREATLY TO THE DIFFICULTY OF NEGOTIATING AN ACCEPTABLE PHASE I AGREEMENT, AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THEY COULD HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD AT THIS LATE DATE AS A SERIOUS COMPROMISE. IN THE COURSE OF EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THE UK TO DROP ITS PROPOSAL, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MAY WISH TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE COMPROMISE LANGUAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE DRAFT POSITION PAPER AS DISCUSSED BELOW, IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE NATO CONSIDERATION OF OPTION 3 WITHOUT SERIOUSLY ENCUMBERING IT WITH ADDITIONAL DEMANDS. END SUMMARY.

2. USE OF THE UK APPROACH COULD HAVE UNFORTUNATE NEGOTIATING CONSEQUENCES. THE ADDITIONS TO THE DRAFT SUPPLEMENT PROPOSED BY THE UK (PARA 5, REFTEL A AND PARA 6, REFTEL E) WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING THE DEMANDS THE WEST MAKES ON THE EAST LONG AFTER THE OPTION 3 OFFER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE EAST. SPECIFICALLY, THE UK PROPOSAL CONTRADICTS PARA 2 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE WHICH STATES THAT ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD REMAIN UNCHANGED. IF, AS PROPOSED BY THE UK, THE WEST HOLDS BACK ADDITIONAL DEMANDS UNTIL LATER STAGES OF THE PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS, THE EAST COULD CLAIM THAT ITS CONSIDERED RESPONSE IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE. AS A RESULT, NATO WOULD HAVE TO EXPEND ADDITIONAL BARGAINING CAPITAL TO GAIN A PHASE I AGREEMENT COVERING THESE ADDITIONAL DEMANDS.

3. WE AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE US REP IN THE OCTOBER 2 SPC MEETING. THIS APPROACH IS YET A FURTHER UK MOVE TOWARD CONFLATION. AS SUCH, IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH NATO'S PHASE APPROACH TO MBFR. ITS USE WOULD UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PHASING. SERIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SPECIFY THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I WOULD UNAVOIDABLY TRIGGER EASTERN DEMANDS FOR ALLIED REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE, LEADING TO EXPLICIT BARGAINING AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES REDUCTIONS MADE BY INDIGENOUS FORCES AND HOW SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE VERIFIED. THE POINTS MADE IN THE ANSWER OF
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QUESTION 3 OF REFTEL (B), CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES OF OPENING PHASE II ISSUES, REMAIN APPLICABLE AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE USED IN THE SPC AS WELL AS POINTS CONTAINED IN REF (C).

4. IN CASE A COMPROMISE IN SPC LANGUAGE APPEARS DESIRABLE IN BRINGING THE UK TO DROP ITS EXTREME POSITION, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER PROPOSING THE FOLLOWING

LANGUAGE TO BE INSERTED AS THE FINAL STATEMENT OF PARA 3
OF THE DRAFT POSITION PAPER (I.E., FOLLOWING THE ORIGINAL
US LANGUAGE OF THE EITHER PARAGRAPH).

BEGIN QUOTE: THE ALLIES SHOULD INSIST THAT A PHASE I
AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE
POST-REDUCTION LEVELS OF ALL US AND SOVIET MILITARY PER-
SONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, EXCEPT FOR THE NAVY.
IF THE COURSE OF PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS MAKES THIS
FEASIBLE, THE ALLIES SHOULD IN ADDITION SEEK A COMMON
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE EAST AS TO THE NUMERICAL LEVEL
OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO BE REACHED FOLLOWING
THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THEY SHOULD ALSO SEEK A COMMON
UNDERSTANDING WITH THE EAST ON THE AGGREGATE LEVEL(S) OF
GROUND (AND AIR) FORCE PERSONNEL OF BOTH SIDES IN THE
AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING THE PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

END QUOTE.

5. THE EFFECT OF THE SUGGESTED CHANGE WOULD BE TO PUT
THE ALLIES ON RECORD AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING
THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING AND REACHING
AGREEMENT ON AGGREGATE NATO/WARSAW PACT DATA ON PHASE I.
THIS LANGUAGE WOULD, HOWEVER, PERMIT THE WEST TO DROP
THESE GOALS SHOULD THEY PROVE TO ENTAIL EXCESSIVE NEGO-
TIATING COSTS FOR THE WEST OR INVOLVE ISSUES WHICH SHOULD
BE DEFERRED TO PHASE II.

6. ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT NUMERICAL DATA MUST BE AGREED
FOR A PHASE I AGREEMENT, OUR ANALYSIS (REFTEL B) SUGGESTS
FIRST THAT IT MAY BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REACH EXPLICIT
AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON DATA, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE
ESSENTIAL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON EXPLICIT FIGURES FOR THE
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RESIDUAL LEVELS FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES FOR THE PERIOD
BETWEEN THE PHASES. CONSEQUENTLY, OUR SUGGESTED CHANGES

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ACTION ACDA-10

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0452

FROM US REP MBFR

WOULD MOVE TOWARD MAKING THIS A REQUIREMENT. AS EXPLAINED IN REFTEL (D), WE THINK IT PREFERABLE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE RESIDUAL LEVELS AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS RATHER THAN SEEK AGREEMENT ON STARTING TOTALS, BECAUSE POST-REDUCTION LEVELS SHOULD BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY CLEAR TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THE PUBLICS. THIS CONTRASTS WITH THE UK APPROACH PUT FORWARD IN REFTEL (E).

7. WE BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT ON THE NUMERICAL COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR NATO AND THE PACT FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE, BUT NOT ESSENTIAL AS A PHASE I OUTCOME. ONE OF OUR MAJOR GOALS IS AN UNAMBIGUOUS BARRIER TO INCREASES OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE NGA. A NUMERICAL CEILING ON EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES IS OF LESSER INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE, CERTAINLY AS CONCERNS THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES. BUT THE EAST
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MAY STRONGLY RESIST AGREEMENT ON OVERALL TOTALS OR PUTTING THEM INTO THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT. FOR THE SAME REASON THE WEST WOULD OPTIMALLY WANT THEM IN: THEY DEMONSTRATE THE SIZE OF THE ADDITIONAL DISPARITY WHICH MUST BE REDUCED BY THE EAST TO ACHIEVE A COMMON CEILING AT ANY LEVEL. WE HAVE, THEREFORE, NOT MADE AGREEMENT

ON OVERALL POST-REDUCTION ALLIANCE TOTALS A REQUIREMENT IN OUR SUGGESTED TEXT. HOWEVER, IF A PHASE I AGREEMENT CONTAINS NUMERICAL SPECIFICATION OF RESIDUAL LEVELS OF SOVIET FORCES, THIS TOGETHER WITH THE FACT THAT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD CONTAINS SEVERAL EASTERN STATEMENTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE 50 PERCENT OF THE FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD ESTABLISH THE APPROXIMATE OVERALL LEVEL OF PACT FORCES AT THE END OF PHASE I. MOREOVER, GAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO NUMERICAL US/SOVIET POST-REDUCTION DATA WOULD SET AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT, SIMPLIFYING THE TASK OF GAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE AGGREGATE ALLIANCE TOTALS IN PHASE II.

8. IF NEEDED TO GET ALLIED AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE RAISED BY THE UK, THE US COULD ADD TO PARA 4 ABOVE THE FURTHER REQUIREMENT THAT AN EAST-WEST EXCHANGE OF DATA COVERING THE OVERALL MANPOWER TOTALS FOR BOTH SIDES MUST TAKE PLACE DURING THE COURSE OF THE PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS. THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD NOT INCREASE ALLIED DEMANDS ON THE EAST AS MUCH AS WOULD REQUIRING EXPLICIT EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON DATA. HOWEVER, IT WOULD PLACE NATO IN A POSITION WHERE NATO COULD REFUSE TO PROCEED IN THE DATA EXCHANGE HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE OR ITS RESULTS PROVED UNSATISFACTORY.

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